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If we can reform ourselves, there is every reason to believe our best days are still ahead. 
A renewed and reinvigorated America that educates all its children could compete with 
any co~lntry. An America that has replaced the culture of poverty and violence with a 
culture of opport~inity would be the safest, most prosperous place on the globe. An 
entreprene~urial America that embraces science and innovation would progress at a 
fantastic pace, opening a vastly greater range of choices to its people than any 
civilization in history. Such a revitalized America could sustain its military and 
diplomatic responsibilities with ease and still find the world eager to be led toward 
greater prosperity, security, and freedom. Once again, America would be the last, best 
hope on earth. 
Erstwhile history professor and Speaker of the House of Representatives 
Newt Gringrich opened his 1995 book, To Renew America, with a litany 
of such appeals to a vision of America as the "last, best hope on earth," 
fashioning himself as an ardent reformer and a card-carrying American 
exceptionalist of the first order. The book - for which Gingrich even- 
tually had to turn down a $4.5 million advance from a publishing 
company owned by Rupert Murdoch amidst cries of influence peddling 
and conflict of interest - initially enjoyed twelve weeks on the New York 
Times best seller list, seven of those in the number one spot. 
But the erratic speaker fell from his pinnacle of political and popular 
grace in the fall of 1995 after he publicly blamed the Democrats and the 
welfare state for the grisly murder of a Chicago mother, her two children, 
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and her unborn baby, and after he admitted that he had precipitated a 
shut-down of the Federal government largely because he didn't like the 
seating arrangements on Air Force One during the 25 hour flight back 
and forth from the funeral of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Soon 
thereafter reinaindered on the book shelves along with the presidential 
aspirations of its author (at least for the time being), To Renew America 
has been pilloried by critics, and with good reason. In an article in The 
New York Review of Books, Joan Didion used Gingrich's own clichkd and 
self-contradictory words to ridicule his thought patterns as relentlessly 
schematic, largely occult, and pointlessly specific, observing at one 
point, "we have here a man who once calculated the odds on the survival 
of his second marriage at 53 to 47."' 
When Didion pounces on Gingrich's advocacy of honeymoons in 
space, his eff~~sive praise of the uniquely American spirit of companies 
that have contributed hundreds of thousands of dollars to his campaign 
coffers, or his description of how America is a land of opportunity 
because it might soon be possible to learn over the internet how to make 
batik you can sell at the mall, her ascerbic glee is infectious. But she 
herself points out that in his "Renewing American Civilization" video 
lecture series, Gingrich declares that "there is an American exceptional- 
ism that can be understood through h is t~ry ."~  As intellectually and 
ethically challenged as To Renew America may be, then, it still deserves 
scrutiny as an example of what has become of American exceptionalism, 
still alive and lticlng as the doctrine approaches another millenium. 
In the book, Gingrich uses exceptionalist ideology to pillory the very 
notion of a multicultural approach to American identity as historically 
suspect, socially detrimental and downright anti-American. In fact, he 
goes out of his way to commit every heresy Joyce Appleby deplores. For 
this reason, Appleby's analysis can serve to delineate the contours of 
Gingrich's particular brand of American exceptionalism. A closer look at 
Gingrich's book serves to highlight certain blind spots in Appleby's own 
vision as well. 
As David Nye points out in this issue, Appleby fails to discuss the 
crucial relationship between technology and exceptionalism. Gingrich's 
I Joan Didion, "TheTeachings of Speaker Gingrich," Tize New Yovlc Review of Boolcs 42 (August 10,1995) 8. 
2 Didion, 7. 
exceptionalism, however, pivots on the potentials he perceives behind 
new information and commuiiication technologies. Mention of techno- 
logy also points toward a weakness professors Gingrich and Appleby 
share. They both work from an understanding of American exceptional- 
ism that seems to have sprung full-grown from the eighteenth century 
and ossified at the latest by the 1830s. Consequently, they both ignore 
historical pressures that have shaped or altered exceptionalist doctrines 
since that time. 
, Although he is clearly the less distinguished historian, Gingrich's 
static and anachronistic understanding of exceptionalism is the more 
striking, since his whole book hinges on the great historical/technological 
transformation he calls "The Third Wave." Gingrich's use of this term 
(borrowed from his futurist gurus Alvin and Heidi Toffler) is highly 
simplistic and wracked with technological determinism. But by another 
name we might call it the shift towards late capitalism, towards a regime 
of flexible accumulation, or towards a high-tech, postmodern service 
economy centered on new information and communications techno- 
logies. The central irony of Gingrich's book is that he preaches both 
American exceptionalism and the Third Wave at the same time, although 
the two work at cross purposes. That is, the globalizing and decentraliz- 
ing tendencies at work within the shift towards this new kind of 
economic order threaten to dissolve the usefulness of the nation state and 
further confuse and fragment the already-problematic notion of an Amer- 
ican national identity itself. 
This contradiction arises in large part from the history of the 
interaction between exceptionalist ideology and the development of new 
technologies of communication in the American context. In the first part 
of this essay I will measure what Appleby would consider Gingrich's 
oppressively unifying ideology against the three insistent themes of 
American exceptionalism she outlines - "the autonomy of the individual 
with its accompanying disparagement of dependency; the clean slate 
with its implicit rejection of the past; and the concept of a uniform human 
nature with its ascription of universality to particular social  trait^."^ Next 
3 Joyce Appleby, "Recovering America's Historic Diversity: Beyond Exceptionalism," Tlze Journal of 
Ainericniz Histofy (September, 1992) 426. 
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I will review how these same themes appear as constants within the 
social construction of new technologies of comm~uiication, from the 
telegraph all the way up to the internet. American reformers have 
celebrated each of these in turn as a force that would wipe the slate clean 
of all unj~lst power relations and sim~~ltaneously ~mify the population, 
empower the individual citizen, and secure the nation's historical 
preeminence as an exemplar of democracy. But powerful corporate 
interests have always also been busy promoting their own vision of a 
communications revolution with exceptionalist rhetoric. These compet- 
ing exceptionalisms became f~lsed together during the broadcast reform 
era of the late '60s and early '70s, when corporate America succeeded in 
cementing into conventional wisdom the notion that progressive reform 
and individual empowerment can res~llt only from deregulation and the 
machinations of an unfettered marlcetplace. As the heir to this tradition 
and the premiere contemporary spokesman for this point of view, Newt 
Gingrich needs to be understood in the context of these historical 
developments. 
To Renew America opens in the manner of a jeremiad, describing in the 
starkest terms possible the moral crisis facing American society. "Either 
we will pull ourselves together for the effort or we will continue to 
decay," Gingrich predicts. "There is virtually no middle g r~und . "~  He 
opts for the former path, of course, and declares that the great challenge 
facing the nation today is the imperative to "renew and reassert American 
civilization." All such alarmist cries of decline presuppose some former 
state of grace, and indeed, Gingrich presupposes the existence of one 
continuous American civilization which he wastes no time in celebrating 
as "the greatest the planet has ever k n ~ w n . " ~  That greatness, Gingrich 
insists, rested on one "clear sense of what it meant to be an American," 
and on the strength of "a set of commonly accepted legal and cultural 
principles." Those principles had existed "from the arrival of the English 
colonists in 1607 until 1965," Gingrich states with a semblance of 
historical precision, and appear crystallized in such diverse sources as de 
4 Newt Gingrich, To Renew America (NY Harper Collins, 1995) 5. 
5 Gingrich, 25. 
Tocqueville's Democracy in America and Norman Rockwell's paintings 
of the 1940s and 50s. 
As Joan Didion has pointed out, Gingrich's thoughts most often 
arrange themselves according to the self-help, outline form favored by 
motivational and managerial therapists using overhead transparencies - 
he is constantly isolating two choices which give way to six challenges, 
which themselves stem from the five basic principles, all of which relate 
crucially to three historical "waves" or epochs, and so on. His list of the 
five basic principles that form the heart of American civilization (in the 
lectures they appear as "Five Pillars") reads as follows: 
1. The common understanding we share about who we are and how we came to be. 
2. The ethic of individual responsibility. 
3. The spirit of entrepreneurial free enterprise. 
4. The spirit of invention and discovery. 
5. Pragmatism and the concern lor craft and excellence, as expressed most recently in 
the teachings of Edwards Demi~ig .~  
Gingrich's list is tautological: the first basic principle that provides the 
basis for our common understanding we share about who we are is none 
other than "the common understanding we share about who we are." His 
list is also fundamentally confrontational, since the only precision his 
otherwise vague principles exhibit derives from their immediate 
opposition to some trumped up and demonized other that threatens the 
continued viability of American civilization. Thus, in his elaboration on 
the first principle, which he calls "the spiritual dimension," Gingrich 
pillories the rest of the world for not maintaining the correct relationship 
to the Creator. "In nearly all countries, power belongs to the state and is 
occasionally loaned to individuals," he says. "In America, power comes 
from God to the individual and is loaned to the state .... It would be hard 
to imagine a greater difference in first  principle^."^ In this manner 
Gingrich claims divine sanction for "who we are," and also legitimizes 
the second principle of American civilization, individual responsibility. 
"Precisely because our rights are endowed by our Creator," Gingrich 
6 Gingrich, 33. 
7 Gingrich, 34. 
150 American Studies in Scandinavia, Vol. 29, 1997 
explains, "the individual bmden of responsibility borne by each citizen is 
greater than in any country." Here the countercult~ml eft, contemporary 
liberals, and pregnant teenagers come under fire for blaming everything 
on "society," and the modern welfare state receives special mention as a 
system that subsidizes idleness and violates the ethic that everyone 
should work hard to improve their own lot without government help. "By 
blaming everything on "society," contemporary liberals are really trying 
to escape the personal responsibility that comes with being an 
American," Gingrich admonishes. "If you are not prepared to shoulder 
personal responsibility, then you are not prepared to participate in 
American ci~ilization."~ 
"True Americans" are innately prepared to shoulder the individual 
responsibility that derives from their special relationship with God, 
Gingrich continues, because they share in the uniquely American spirit of 
free enterprise, his third principle. Gingrich credits American entre- 
preneurial genius, the desire to get up in the morning and "invent a 
slightly better mousetrap for the world," with the happy fact that at every 
level of American society, "people can improve their own lot." Again, the 
flaccid platitude sharpens its rhetorical teeth on its supposed opposite, as 
Gingrich insists that unlike Europe and other class-dominated cultures, 
"we have no caste system, no class requirements, no regulated 
professions, no barriers to entry" to hold us back from entrepreneurial 
achievement. In France, Gingrich explains, only graduates of the ~ c o l e  
Nationale d'administration can hold important government positions, 
but in the U.S. "even a professor from a small college in Georgia can 
aspire to the highest levels of gove~nment."~ He concludes: 
Generosity, tlust, optimlsin and hard work - these are the elements that drive the 
American entrepreneurial system, creating the most powerful and vibrant economy the 
world has ever known. Unfortunately, this isn't as easy as it used to be. Taxes, 
regulation, and litigation have all thrown a blanket over the entrepreneurial spirit. Elite 
criticisms of the can-do spirit have undermined that ethic. Credentialing of the 
professions has raised barriers to entrepreneurial inventiveness. The welfare system has 
sapped the spirit of the poor and made it harder to climb the first rungs of the economic 
ladder.I0 
8 Gingrich, 39. 
9 Gingrich, 41. 
10 Gingl-ich, 43 
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Although Gingrich insists that a "true American" confronted with a 
problem will never ask "Who can I blame this on?," a consistent pattern 
of blame undergirds his book. Every time he cites an American virtue, he 
immediately indicts an elite cabal of nefarious, left-leaning intellectuals 
and countercultural special interest groups for conspiring to undermine it. 
On the very first page of To Renew America, he states: 
While we as a people were winning our battles around tlie world, here at home our 
elites were deserting us. For tlie past thirty years, we have been influenced to abandon 
our culture and seem to have lost faith in the core values, traditions, and institutions of  
our civilization. The intellectual nonsense propagated since 1965 - in the media, on 
university campuses, even among our religious and political leaders - now threatens to 
cripple our ability to teach the next generation to be Ainerican~.~~ 
So the problem stems from the 1960s, when the countercult~~re b gan to 
use "situational ethics" and "deconstructionism" to repudiate solid 
middle-class values and universal standards of right and wrong. 
"Multiculturalism switched the emphasis from proclaiming allegiance to 
the common culture to proclaiming the virtues (real or imagined) of a 
particular ethnicity, sect, or tribe," Gingrich complains, while "traditional 
history has been replaced by the notion that every group is entitled to its 
own version of the past" and "moral standards have been replaced by 
'role-playing."'12 In Gingrich's mind, these heretical kinds of thinlcing 
have led to the dissolution of the consensus about what American 
civilization should be. In the context of his jeremiad, this represents the 
breaking of the covenant, and the reason why American civilization has 
to be renewed at all. 
Joyce Appleby traces how exceptionalism originated in Europe even 
before America became a nation, but only began to flourish as a unifying 
ideology on the other side of the Atlantic in the mid-1790s, when it 
became a potent weapon in a plebeian radical attack on the aristocratic 
pretensions of a federalist elite. Exactly two centuries later, Newt 
Gingrich carries on this legacy of exceptionalist attack politics, painting 
himself as a representative of the common people, and directing his 
11 Gingrich, 3,4. 
12 Gingrich, 30. 
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animus against the straw figure of a "liberal elite," a cadre of counter 
culture intellectuals, multiculturalists, and Washington insiders who want 
to promote teenage pregnancy, raise taxes, increase the size of govern- 
ment and take as much power as possible away from the individual 
American. By his own design a modern-day version of Appleby's "undis- 
tinguished citizen," Giiigrich has capitalized on such attack rhetoric to 
effect a change of personnel within Congress, to defeat venerable 
traditions of authority within the House of Representatives, and to paint 
himself as a hero for p~llling the responsibility for the national political 
agenda down the social ladder. 
Like Appleby's propagandists of American democracy, Gingrich has 
achieved this feat by taking f~lll  advantage of a "dense new communica- 
tions network" - in his instance, cable television, satellite delivery 
systems, and right-wing talk radio - in order to wrest away "the control 
over information and opinions once exercised exclusively by an elite."13 
Along the way he has offended even many conservatives with his crass 
self-assertion and bombastic new form of politics. He also has succeeded, 
to borrow Appleby's words, in elevating "what might be construed 
elsewhere as uninterestingly plebeian," to the level of "a new goal for 
mankind."14 
The three central themes Appleby perceives behind the nascent 
doctrine of American exceptionalism all resurface in Gingrich's rhetoric. 
The first of these - the autonomy of the individual with its accompanying 
disparagement of dependency - crystallizes into Gingrich's second pillar, 
and motivates his attacks on welfare. "The classic American is an inde- 
pendent, self-reliant, hard working, honest person of no great wealth or 
social status," Gingrich tells us, but "nothing could be less traditionally 
American than the modern welfare system," because it breeds a cycle of 
dependency and "violates the American ethic that everyone should work 
hard."15 The certainty with which Gingrich advances these opinions 
brings to the fore the second theme Appleby isolates. "By construing 
their own liberty as liberation from historic institutions," says Appleby of 
> 
13 Appleby, 423. 
14 Appleby, 424. 
15 Gingrich, 39. 
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the early exceptionalists, "the enthusiasts of democracy made the United 
States the pilot society for the world." Gingrich likewise univers a 1' izes 
particular American social traits as normative and proscriptive ideals for 
all humankind, and then proceeds to use this same self-evident univer- 
sality to turn dissent into deviation and thereby to exclude whole groups 
of Americans from his definition of American national character 
altogether. This is how he comes lo the conclusion that welfare recipients 
and those who swear allegiance to a particular ethnicity, sect or tribe are 
not "true Americans." The real bad apples to be sorted out of the bunch, 
of course, are the liberal elite who have conspired to pollute and degrade 
American civilization with their deviant ideals. 
The third and most important exceptionalist theme Joyce Appleby 
highlights is the notion of the clean slate, with its rejection of the past and 
of all European cultural baggage, and with its vision of a new frontier 
where all of the old institutions and problems would simply vanish. "The 
clean slate suggests most powerfully a freedom of choice - the freedom 
to be the designer of one's own life unaided or impeded by others," 
Appleby explains. "It also denied the force of history, for it is past actions 
that clutter up the metaphorical slate." Garry Wills has pointed out that in 
spite of Gingricli's animus towards intellectual elites, he insists upon his 
status as a history professor in order to legitimize his ideas ("How many 
of us have taken a history class," asla Wills, "in which the professor tells 
you in class, every class, sometimes several times in one session, that he 
is a profes~or?"~~) As Wills also points out, Gingrich's approach to 
American history is "celebratory, based on static symbols for enduring 
values." Gingrich does away with those bothersome historical realities 
that do not affirm conservative values by means of his own particular 
brand of clean slatism. For Gingrich, the slate is wiped clean by 
technology, and his peculiar posture towards technology bears special 
mention, as it is the source of his most "occult" ideas. 
"Imagine a morning in just a decade or so," Gingrich encourages 
readers of To Renew America. "You wake up to a wall-size, high- 
definition television showing surf off Maui (this is my favorite island - 
you can pick your own scene)." As the day progresses, Gingrich tells us, 
16 Garry Wills, "The Visionary," The New YorlcRevzew ofBooks (March 23, 1995) 6 .  
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we never have to go outside, since we can "do Stairmaster while catching 
up on the morning news," and we can all telecommute to work from 
home via computer, thus avoiding rush hour traffic. "When you are sick, 
you sit in your diagnostic chair and cominunicate with the local health 
clinic," he predicts. "Sensors take your blood pressure, analyze a blood 
sample, or do throat cultures." Since medical information systems have 
become so advanced, we won't really need any doctors, and we can save 
money by deciding on our own treatment.17 Legal trouble? No problem, 
says Gingrich. "you can write your own will, file your own adoption 
papers, form your own partnership or corporation - all with software 
programs available in your home." According to Gingrich, these techno- 
logical developments will cause no great displacement of workers in the 
medical or legal professions. "Fortunately, since most lawyers were 
reasonably smart and well-educated people, they have been able to find 
other lines of work.'" 
Gingrich is clearly in the thrall of a space age, even science-fiction 
conception of technology and technological change. His formulations are 
stridently technologically deterministic and naive, sometimes eyen 
childlike in the extreme. "Absent an idea that can be sold at Disney 
World," Joan Didion observes, "he has tended to lose interest."18 At one 
point later in the book he suggests that it would not be all that impossible 
to construct a real Jurassic Park, and that such an endeavor would be "one 
of the most spectacular accomplishments of human history."19 Gingrich's 
romance with technology becomes most literal in his bizaare description 
of the possibility of honeymoons in space, an idea he recycles from his 
1984 book, Window of Opportunity: 
I believe that space to~urism will be a common fact of life during the adulthood of 
children born this year, that honeymoons in space will be the vogue by 2020. Imagine 
weightlessness and its effects and you will understand some of its attractions. Imagine 
looking out at the Earth from your honeymoon suite and you will understand even more 
why it will be a big item.2o 
17 Gingrich, 55. 
18 Didion, 8. 
19 Gingrich, 190. 
20 Gingrich, 192. 
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No commentator can fail to marvel at how ridiculous Gingrich appears 
willing to sound, but the Speaker's unself-conscious inanity tends to 
distract attention away from the significant development in the ltind of 
exceptionalist thought he advances. As Tom Byers and James Mendel- 
sohn stress elsewhere in this issue, land, wilderness, and the frontier have 
often served as the foundational justification for exceptionalism itself. 
Gingrich's exceptionalism eclipses the natural world altogether. He 
doesn't invoke the surf off the island of Maui, but rather a wall-sized 
television image thereof. He dreams of replicant dinosaurs. He is so 
distanced from the natural world that in his fantasies, even the fertility 
ritual of the honeymoon itself can only gaze on the earth from space - a 
great view, no doubt, but a view none the same, and a very distant one at 
that. There is no direct experience of nature in Gingrich7s imaginary 
future, which leads Joan Didion to describe it as "a ltind of endless 
Delta Without any intimate connection to the iconic Amer- 
ican landscape, we have here an exceptionalism of a very different 
order. 
The concept that replaces the land in Gingrich is the Third Wave 
Information Revolution, this radical transformation or "discontinuity" as 
he calls it, that allows him to summarize all of world history in a few 
short paragraphs and then to chuck it out of the window altogether, since 
it simply doesn't apply anymore. Citing his friends Heidi and Alvin 
Toffler, authors of Future Shock, The Third Wave, and a host of other 
pop-futurist analyses of technological change, Gingrich explains that 
"the transformation we are experiencing is so large and historic that it can 
be compared with only two other great eras of human history - the 
Agricultural Revolution and the Industrial Revolu t i~n ."~~ As he 
elaborates further in his foreword to the Toffler's 1994 book, Creating a 
New Civilization: The Politics of the The Third Wave: 
The Tofflers correctly understand that development and distribution of information has 
now become the central productivity and power activity of the human race. From world 
financial markets to the worldwide, twenty-four-hour-a-day distrib~rtion of news via 
21 Didion, 8. 
22 Gingrich 52 
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CNN to the brealtthroughs of the biological revolution and their impact on health and 
agricultural production - on virtually every front we see the inforination revolution 
changing the fabric, pace and substance of our lives.23 
The Third Wave functions as Gingrich7s New Frontier, clean slate, and 
deus ex machina, automatically returning America to its important core 
values. According to Gingrich, for example, contemporary liberalism is 
an outdated, "Second Wave" phenomenon, and the coming of the Third 
Wave will discredit liberal ideals once and for all. "While the Industrial 
Revolution herded people into gigantic social institutions - big 
corporations, big unions, big government," he explains, "the Information 
Revolution is breaking up these giants and leading us back to something 
that is, strangely enough, much more like de Tocqueville's 1830s 
America." In this "Back to the Future7' scenario, every new technological 
change promotes greater individual autonomy and personal choice, and 
Gingrich harbors no doubts about where the benefits of the Third Wave 
Information Age will accrue. Americans should not fear the rush of 
changes associated with the Third Wave, he insists, since those changes 
will restore the nation to its rightful preeminence as a world leader. "The 
coming of the 3rd Wave brings potential for enourmous improvement in 
the lifestyle choices of most Americans," Gingrich predicts. "If we can 
grasp the true significance of these changes, we can lead the world into 
the Information Age and leave our children a country unmatched in 
wealth, power and opport~nity."~~ 
In classic exceptionalist fashion, Gingrich attaches such weight to his 
concept of the Third Wave that his every observation becomes 
universalized and invested with certitude and inevitability. "Aside from 
the Third Wave concept there is no effective system of analysis which 
makes sense of the frustration and confusion which characterizes politics 
and government virtually everywhere in the industrial world," he asserts 
in his foreword to the Tofflers' book.  here is no language to commu- 
23 Newt Gingnch, "Forewad: A Citizen's Guide to the 21st Century," in Alvin and Heidi Toffler, Creating 
o New Civilizntiorz: The Politics of the The Third Wave (Atlanta: Turner P~tblishing, 1994) 14. 
24 Gingrich, 57,7. 
nicate the problems we face, no vision to outline the future towards 
which we should strive, and no program to help accelerate and male 
easier the tran~ition."~~ 
At first glance, Gingrich's visions of the future may seem downright 
wacky, but in the context of the history of the reception of new 
technologies in America, they appear quite familiar. American culture 
always has made room for those with an almost unswerving faith in 
technological progress and in the notion that advances in technology 
translate directly into advances in the perceived democratic nature of 
American society and in the ultimate triumph of the "American way of 
life." Enthusiasts of this point of view, especially those within the media 
industry have reserved their most exuberant praise for the various 
technologies of communication, promising that those technologies would 
unify the nation, promote the democratic exchange of ideas, and 
champion each individual citizen's right to free speech under the First 
Amendment. Newt Gingrich did not import an enthusiasm over new 
technologies of communication into American exceptionalist rhetoric 
himself. Rather, he stands in a long line of American exceptionalists 
hopeful that some new technological fix will wipe the slate clean of 
aberrant historical developments and return the nation to the kind of 
imagined Toquevillian idyll he holds so dear. 
For example, as Daniel Czitrom points out in Media and the American 
Mind, the "universal communication" made possible by the advent of the 
telegraph in the 1850s, was celebrated as a force that would bring the 
5 Republic closer together, help fulfill America's "manifest destiny," and in 
the words of the editor of American Telegraph Magazine, allow for 
"nearly all our vast and wide-spread populations [to be] bound together, 
not merely by political institutions but by a Telegraph and Lightning-like 
affinity of intelligence and sympathy, that renders LIS emphatically "ONE 
PEOPLE" e~erywhere ."~~ Another commentator in an 1858 issue of the 
25 Newt Gingrich, "Foreward: A Citizen's Guide to the 21st Century," 15. 
26 Daniel J. Czitrom, Media and the Anzerican Mind: From Morse to McLulzan (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1982) 10. Quoting Donald Mann, "Telegraphing of Election Returns," American 
Telegraph Magazine 1 (November, 1852) 76. 
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New Englander declared that the telegraph "gives the preponderance of 
power to the nations representing the highest elements in humanity."27 By 
1866, however, Western Union had become the largest firm in American 
history to that point, and its monopolistic stranglehold on the glorious 
new technology of telegraphy allowed it to charge exorbitant rates for its 
use; by the 1880s Bell telephone had done almost the same for telephone 
communications. 
In this climate, S~lsan Douglas points out in Inventing American 
Broadcasting, hopes for the realization of the democratic potential 
assumed to lie dormant in communications technology, or at least the 
rhetorical expression thereof, were transferred to the new technology of 
wireless telegraphy, which was introduced in 1899. Power-hungry trusts 
could easily control lines and wires, reasoned many critics of Western 
Union, but corporations would have a more difficult time monopolizing 
the airwaves, which were often described in the popular press as a sort of 
mysterious ether vested with magical powers. When wireless technology 
itself evolved into the institution of broadcast radio, and individual sets 
became available for the reception of sound transmissions in the home in 
the early 1920s, commentators again declared that communications 
technology would finally spread "mutual understanding to all sections of 
the country, unifying our thoughts, ideals, and purposes, making us a 
strong and well-knit people."28 Douglas isolates the pattern according to 




trayed as an autonomous force, capable of revolutionizing American 
culture. It was a machine that would make history. It was also portrayed as a technology 
without a history. Rarely, in those heady, breathless articles about the radio boom, was 
reference made to the twenty-five years of technical, economic, and cultural 
experimentation that had led to and produced radio broadcasting. Radio was thus 
presented as an invention not burdened by a past or shackled to the constraining 
conventions of the established social order, but as an invention free to reshape, on its 
own terms, the patterns of American life.29 
27 Czitrom, 10. 
28 Stanley Frost, "Radio Dreams That Can Come Trne," Collier's 69 (June 10, 1922) 18; quoted in Susan 
Douglas, Inventing American Broadcasting, 1899-1922 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987) 
306. 
29 Douglas, xv. 
Not surprisingly, the advent of the ability to transmit not only sound, but 
images as well, gave rise to a similar flourish of enthusiasm. In a speech 
in 1931, RCA executive David Sarnoff waxed grandeloquent about the 
virtues of the next major development in the commuilications and 
broadcasting industry: 
When television has f~~lfilled its ultimate destiny, man's sense of physical limitation 
will be swept away and his boundaries of sight and hearing will be the limits of the 
earth itself. With this may come a new horizon, a new pl~ilosophy, a new sense of 
freedom, and greatest of all, perhaps, a finer and broader understanding between all the 
peoples of the world.30 
Willard D. Rowland Jr. has stressed the intimate connections between 
this faith in communications technology as an agent capable of restoring 
an ideal democratic community and the core beliefs of American 
progressivism. Some forty years ago Richard Hofstadter isolated the 
general theme of the progressive movement as "the effort to restore a 
type of economic individualism and political democracy that was widely 
believed to have existed earlier in America and to have been destroyed by 
the great corpo~ation and the corrupt political machine, and with that 
restoration to bring back a kind of morality and civic purity that was also 
believed to have been lost."31 The rationalizing tendencies within the 
progressive movement, Rowland elaborates, led it to cling to the notion 
that modern man, possessed of an analytical mind and the latest 
advances in science, technology and education, could yoke the power of 
modernization and industrialization to the task of restoring the commun- 
itarian ideal. "Underneath the progressive program was an explicit faith 
in a reconstituted human nature, and an implicit belief in the utility of 
modern communications," explains Rowland. "That faith in the amelior- 
ative power of communications carried forward with redoubled strength 
into the coming age of radio and televis i~n."~~ 
This enthusiasm served as a significant shaping force behind Progres- 
sive Era communications legislation. The Radio Act of 1927 and the Com- 
30 Quoted in Robert Bsitt Horwitz, The Irony ofRegulnto7y Refoim: The Dei*egulntion of Telecoinmuizicnt- 
ions (178). 
31 Richard Hofstadtes, The Age of Reform (New Yosk: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954) 213. 
32 Rowland, 8. 
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munications Act of 1934 started from the notion that the electromagnetic 
spectrum constituted a limited natural resource owned in common by all 
the people of the United States. Lawmakers and regulators insisted that 
since the spectrum could support only a certain n~~mber  of broadcast 
outlets operating on certain frequencies, those licensed to use it must act 
as trustees of that precious resource serving in the public interest. The 
doctrine of the public interest in broadcasting held up an ideal of a truly 
democratic broadcast system managed by private companies serving in 
the public interest according to the community-oriented principle of 
localism. That principle held that local broadcasters must fulfill their 
public trustee function by serving their individual communities with 
programs of local interest and concern and by providing for a broad range 
of local expression over the airwaves. 
Jeffersonian ideals of local broadcasters serving an enlightened 
citizenry may have undergirded the framing of the earliest federal 
communications legislation, but as Robert Horwitz stresses in The Irony 
of Regulatory Reform, the power of the comm~~nications industry has 
always been such that federal regulation has done little more than graft 
these kinds of lofty egalitarian and cornmunitarian principles onto a pre- 
existing industrial structure characterized by intense concentrations of 
capital and private ownership.33 After all, the communications industry 
had had more than three quarters of a century to grow into a monopolistic 
and profit-hungry monolith by the time federal regulation began to 
develop in earnest. In this situation mutually beneficial turf agreements 
hashed out between the communications giants were presented to federal 
regulators as done deals. Rather than challenge these collusive arrange- 
ments, the state wrote them into federal law in such a way that what had 
been merely profitable for the interested parties came to seem natural and 
inevitable. 
For this reason, Susan Douglas maintains, the romantic rhetoric 
applied to technological advances "helped legitimate the private, cor- 
porate control of machines as the only equitable and progressive method 
of management."34 Most of the money spent to explore and develop these 
33 Horwitz, passim. 
34 Douglas, xxvi. 
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new technologies (especially television) came from these same corpora- 
tions, which further pushed the resulting advances in communication into 
the service of private profit. The federal government also encouraged the 
development of a private, commercial infrastructure for the commun- 
ications industry by means of promotion, subsidy, and sanctioning of 
corporate control. One important example of this is the manner in which 
the US Navy handed all of its patents for long distance radio communica- 
tion over to General Electric after World War I, leading to the creation of 
the Radio Corporation of America, which would dominate radio and 
television for years to come.35 
Committed to a market-based system by the sheer power of the com- 
munications conglomerates such as RCA, yet blinded to market realities 
by the swirl of rhetoric surrounding communications technologies, fed- 
eral communications regulation failed to address squarely the two most 
salient aspects of the broadcasting industry itself. The first of these was 
the fact that money would have to be made, and this would end up being 
achieved by advertising. The lofty hopes and ideals surrounding broad- 
casting initially created a situation in which all parties involved agreed 
that advertising would sully the new media with impure motives and 
crass moneymaking. None other than David Sarnoff, the president of 
RCA, originally called for the financing of radio programming by means 
of a national fund fueled by a percentage of the profits realized by radio 
manufacturers and dealers. As late as 1924, then-Secretary of Commerce 
Herbert Hoover stated that "the quicltest way to kill broadcasting would 
be to use it for direct ad~ertising."~~ But such attacks on the direct 
advertising of consumer goods had the effect of smoothing the way for 
the "indirect selling" implicit in commercially sponsored programming, 
'which quickly became the norm. 
Manufacturers soon became enamored of the effectiveness with which 
attaching their names to popular broadcasts could help boost sales, and 
by 1925 nearly half of the 547 radio stations in operation in the United 
States sold air time to commercial sponsors.37 By 1927, the resistence to 
35 Erik Bamonw, T~ibe of Plenty: Tlze Evolution of A~zericnrz Television , seco~~d revised edition (NY 
Oxford, 1990) 20-23; Horwitz, 110; Douglas, 285-286, 290-291. 
36 Ibid, 114 
37 Czitrom, 79. 
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direct advertising had been overcome, and admen like Edgar Felix could 
exclaim of the practice, "What a glorious opportunity for the advertising 
man to spread his sales propaganda ... American business men, because of 
radio, are provided with a latch key to nearly every home in the United 
States."38 Federal regulation "in the public interest" clearly encouraged 
such a presumptuously invasive attitude. In his work on the broadcast 
sponsor, Erik Barnouw quotes a 1935 st~tdy in the Harvard Business 
Review which concluded that "the Federal Radio Commission has 
interpreted the concept of public interest so as to favor in actual practice 
one particular group ... the commercial  broadcaster^."^^ 
The second reality of the broadcasting marketplace was that lots of 
money had to be made, both because broadcasting (especially television) 
is very expensive and because companies always want to make more 
money. This was achieved by the creation of broadcast networks. 
Networking allowed broadcasters to take advantage of massive econom- 
ies of scale, spreading the cost of production out amongst a number of 
distribution outlets and offering advertisers blanket coverage ill a variety 
of markets at once during choice hours of the broadcast schedule. AT&T 
began cxpwimenting with the connection of local radio stations by means 
of coaxial cables for special events as early as 1922. After 1926, when 
AT&T got out of the business of owning radio stations in exchange for 
the exclusive right to interconnect broadcast networlts over its wires, 
RCA, Westinghouse, and General Electric formed the National 
Broadcasting Company (NBC), which would operate both a "Red" and a 
"Blue" radio network (the government would later force the latter to 
break off and become the American Broadcasting Network [ABC]). By 
the time the Columbia Broadcasting System formed in 1929, less than 
20% of all radio stations had affiliated themselves with a network, but 
those same stations raked in a full 72% of the $27 million spent on radio 
ad~er t i s ing .~~ 
The preeminence of chain broadcasting flew in the face of the 
regulatory principle of localism, because it took almost all of the decision 
38 Quoted in Czitrom, 77. 
39 E. Pendleton Herring, "Politics and Radio Regulation," Harvard Business Review (Janurary, 1935), 
quoted in Banouw, 28. 
40 Horwitz, 114, 121. 
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malting power over programming away from individual, local broadcast 
licensees and handed it over to large national corporations. Networking 
ensured that the big money in broadcast advertising would come 
primarily from national coverage, and this gave national advertisers a 
strong say over programming content and left local television 
broadcasters with little incentive to serve the idiosyncratic needs of their 
ow11 community in any real sense. By the 1960s, then, federal broad- 
casting regulation "in the public interest" came to protect a centralized 
system of three advertising-supported, national television networlcs as the 
American, democratic system of television. The big three television 
networks held an oligopoly over what the public saw, and treated 
television viewers as a mass market. Moreover the Federal Commu- 
nications Coininission used the regulatory principle of localism to justify 
actions that protected the big three networlts - who by their very 
existence effectively sabotaged any hope of realizing a truly community- 
based, democratic television system. As Horwitz concludes, the very 
ideals undergirding federal communications regulation led those who 
framed it to "misconstrue the nature of a capitalist communications 
system," while [he image of the broadcaster "in the mythic haze of the 
small-town Jeffersonian p~~b l i c  sphere served only to veil the actual 
practices and consequences of a commercially organized, national 
system of networlt br~adcasting."~~ 
It did not take much to recognize that something had gone awry, and 
the same ideals that undergirded the networlt system eventually ignited a 
movement to reform it. Amidst the general climate of citizen activism 
that characterized the late 1960s, a loose but broad-based and diverse 
coalition of minority groups and community organizations now labeled 
collectively as the broadcast reform movement sought to challenge the 
regulatory status quo on such matters as minority programming and 
hiring practices, television violence, the nature of children's program- 
ming, truth in advertising, and the responsiveness of the networlts and 
their affiliates to community input. These groups pursued three strategies 
to achieve their goals. The first two were technical and legal attempts to 
hold the broadcast regulatory process accountable to its own first 
41 Horwitz, 194. 
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principles. Many community groups, armed with the rhetoric of the 
Comm~mications Act, sought to block the renewal of individual broad- 
cast licenses by filing "petitions to deny" on the basis that the broad- 
casters had not lived up to their public interest obligations. Other groups 
argued that the FCC's Fairness Doctrine gave them the right of 
mandatory access to the airwaves to express their views. Neither of these 
strategies met with much direct success. The 342 petitions to deny filed 
between 1971 and 1973 did not result in the suspension of a single 
broadcast license, and the FCC has only taken away one s ~ ~ h  license in 
its entire history. Although attempts to gain citizen access to the airwaves 
eventually led to a complete ban on cigarette advertising on television, 
the Supreme Court ruled in 1973 that the public did not have anything 
like a mandatory right of access to the broadcast airwaves.42 
The third front on which the members of the broadcast reform 
movement so~lght to advance their various interests ended up exerting the 
most impact on the industry - although certainly not in the way the 
reformers themselves may have envisioned - because it returned to the 
core of cultural beliefs concerning the transformative and beneficient 
power of technology that had undergirded the formation of federal 
communications regulation in the first place. The same dissatisfaction 
with the power of the networks that had inspired the wave of petitions to 
deny and the many attempts to gain access and equal time also gave rise 
to a movement to seek out viable alternatives to commercial network 
broadcasting altogether. This impulse clearly lay behind the Public 
Broadcasting Act of 1967, which united struggling educational stations 
from around the country into the Public Broadcasting Service. The search 
for alternatives caught fire when it united with the notion that new 
technologies of television signal delivery could circumvent the tradi- 
tional broadcasting structure altogether, rendering the power of the com- 
mercial networks obsolete and ushering in a democratic communications 
revolution. Specifically, this "new technologies" rhetoric attached itself 
to the expansion of cable systems and to the development of satellite 
communications. 
Cable had been around since as early as 1948, but the new enthusiasm 
42 Horwitz, 250 
ignored its technical, economic, political and cultural entanglements in 
the television industry over the past twenty years and treated it as a 
technology without a history, very much in the manner radio had been 
celebrated in the 1920s. The new technologies rhetoric seized upon 
cable's ability to import multiple channels into the home as a means of 
finally insuring the kind of diversity that would serve the public interest, 
giving a voice to minorities, the elderly, handicapped persons, and other 
previously disenfranchised groups through electronic conferences and 
"town meetings." It also maintained that the technical capability of two- 
way communication over cable would allow individuals and groups to 
"talk back" to their television sets, instantly ushering in a democratic 
communications revelation that would solve the problem of public 
access. 
The grandiose heights to which the new technologies rhetoric could 
soar is well reflected in Don LeDuc's introduction to his otherwise sober 
study of cable regulation, published in 1973. Enthusiasm for cable had 
not arisen because it offered a closed-circuit means of distribution that 
would allow for selective price discrimination, LeDuc argued, but 
because of ils ability to provide the public with an abundance of viewing 
alternatives from which to choose. He went on: 
The competitive strength of cable, then, seems based upon the same fundamental 
human urge, an apparently insatiable desire for ever more extensive cominunications 
service, which has spurred the evolution of each successive mass medium since the 
advent of the industrial age in Western society. It may be that industrialization, in 
diluting the strength of the oral tradition, instilled in modern man a craving for the 
certitude that was once drawn from countless springs of communal and kinship custom 
- a thirst no narrow and mechanized message channel has the capacity to quench. In 
this context the cable medium could represent the first communications force capable 
, 
of ending man's Tantalus-like quest; its vast array of channels offering the diverse, 
variant, and thus more human message bonds which mass-produced units of 
entertainment and news have supplanted but have failed to replace.43 
Horwitz points out that this kind of rhetoric was not the exclusive 
province of idealistic liberals and grass-roots organizers. Free market 
economists waxed just as enthusiastic about cable in studies funded by 
43 Don R. LeDnc, Cable Television nnd the FCC: A Crisis in Media Control (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1973) vii. 
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such sources as the Rand Corporation, the Alfred Sloan Foundation, the 
Ford Foundation, and the John and Mary Marltle F~unda t ion .~~  And the 
Jolii~son, Nixon, and Ford administrations all formed task forces and 
cominissions that strongly advocated the development of new teclino- 
logies, especially cable, as tlie solution to the problems plaguing broad- 
casting in the US. These groups helped channel the debate over broadcast 
reform in the direction of neolibertarian economic rhetoric, whereby a 
free and open marketplace would solve all of the problems of corporate 
perfidy and public disenfranchisement in broadcasting by effecting tlie 
efficient development of new technologies of delivery. 
This kind of rhetoric gained a wide hearing beca~~se it comported well 
with the designs of the major players in the communications industry 
themselves, whose interests lay in quieting criticism of their power while 
siinultaneously opening new markets to increase that power into the 
fut~lre. Other corporate players, chief among them defense contractors 
that had performed communications and aerospace research for the 
military, had a vested interest in challenging the regulatory protection of 
the broadcast networks so that they could move into commercial cable 
and satellite signal delivery themselves. "The reform movement had 
done much to focus the attack on the regulatory process as too pro- 
tectionist of established industrial hegeinoney and too little concerned 
about the public service component of the public interest standard," 
points out Willard Rowland in his study of the broadcast reform 
movement. "For a much longer period of time, though, the industry had 
been malting assaults on the regulatory process as unnecessarily 
bureaucratic, economically inefficient and an infringement on its right as 
an extension of the press, operating under First Amendment freedoms."45 
The broadcast reform movement ended up realizing its most 
significant gains when it joined in this chorus of voices calling for the 
deregulation of cable and satellite technology as a means of achieving 
content diversity, public access, and free information flow through the 
good graces of a free and open marketplace. But this turned out to be a 
44 See for example, On the Cable: The Television ofAburzdnrzce: Report of the Slonn Commission on Cable 
Conz7?zunicntions (New Yorlc: McGraw Hill, 1971); "Rand criticizes FCC's CATV approach," Broadcnstirzg 
(October 26, 1970) 46; "Report Ties Profits to CATV Penetration," Broadcasting (February 15, 1971) 56. 
45 Rowland, 30. 
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Faustian bargain. "By the time deregulation began to take shape, the 
reasons for the reform concerns had been forgotten and the longstanding 
major industrial interests had reasserted themselves," explains Rowland. 
"Deregulation was to go forward, but public service considerations were 
ignored - or at best they were assumed to be realizable through 
marketplace forces."46 By the end of the 1970s, the FCC was actively 
promoting cable as an alternative to the network oligopoly. Under the 
Reagan adniinistration it moved further to abolish ownership limits, 
restrictions on cross-ownership, the Fairness Doctrine, rules regarding 
children's programming and advertising, and almost anything else that 
stood in the way of unbridled competition and expansion in the media 
industry. 
Of course, all of this deregulation did not really democratize the 
media. Because financial barriers to full participation in the media 
economy are so high, it merely opened up the industry to let a few more 
heavily capitalized players in - such as Ted Turner's Turner Broadcasting 
System and Rupert Murdoch's News Corp. Inc. - and allowed the 
telephone giants and the film industry to move into television and cable, 
and vice-versa. These corporations quickly divvied up the spoils of the 
newly liberalized market, then began looking overseas for even larger 
vistas. This process has led to the complete abandonment of the public 
interest obligations formerly imposed on media entities, and to 
previously unimaginable levels of globalization, concentration and 
conglomeration in the media industry, as witnessed most recently by the 
mergers of Disney and Capital CitiesIABC and of Time-Warner and the 
Turner Broadcasting System. 
This media concentration has occurred in the name of empowering 
individual citizens and promoting greater freedom. Signing into law the 
Telecommunications Reform Act of 1995, which further dismantled 
barriers to media concentration and steered clear of imposing any 
positive public interest obligations altogether, President Bill Clinton 
declared that it would "stimulate investment, promote competition, 
provide open access for all citizens to the Information Superhighway, 
strengthen and improve universal service and provide families with 
46 Ibid 
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technologies to help them control what kind of programs come into their 
homes over television." He concluded, "As a result of this action today, 
consumers will receive the benefits of lower prices, better quality and 
greater choices in their telephone and cable services, and they will 
continue to benefit from a diversity of voices and viewpoints in radio, 
television and the print media." 
The American social construction of new technologies of communication 
appears permeated with exceptionalist ideology, and Newt Gingrich's 
flights of technological fancy appear quite mainstream in this context. All 
three of the insistent themes Joyce Appleby highlights in her analysis of 
the development of American exceptionalism resurface again and again 
in the rhetoric surrounding the development of telegraph, broadcasting, 
cable, and other forms of electronic signal delivery. American law- 
makers, regulators, reformers, and industry leaders have greeted these 
technologies as instruments that would promote individual liberty and 
personal autonomy. In their enthusiasm, they have made sweeping claims 
about human nature, interpreting the inevitable culmination of technolo- 
gical and historical developments as the triumph of American democratic 
ideals. In order to make these claims in the face of often overwhelming 
evidence to the contrary, they have treated each successive new 
technology of communication as if it had no history, thereby participating 
in their own form of clean slatism. The histories wiped off the slate in the 
process have had little to do with idealized Jeffersonian communities of 
enlightened and empowered citizens and everything to do with what has 
been truly distinctive in America - which David Nye describes elsewhere 
in this issue as the centrality of business to American culture and that 
peculiarly American form of business organization, the private corpora- 
tion. 
As the preceding discussion has shown, for example, the predomi- 
nance of commerce in American culture meant that almost from the 
beginning the broadcasting public was effectively synonymous with the 
competitive broadcasting market. For the vast majority of the population, 
broadcasting never represented a means of communication, but rather a 
means of consumption, and the freedom promised by the enthusiasts of 
the new technology of broadcasting was in reality the freedom to choose 
from a limited range of programming options. In the context of the 
NEWT'S CLEAN SLATE 169 
progressive era rhetoric that informed the framing of federal communica- 
tions legislation, Willard D. Rowland explains, "references to democracy 
and to audience participation equated consumption with power," and "the 
myth of audience power, which rested on the myth of consumer choice, 
became reified and held up as evidence that Americans possessed 
unprecedented political and economic freedom."47 The broadcast 
reformers of the late 1960s and early 1970s inherited this confusion over 
the difference between democracy and consumer capitalism, and for this 
reason sowed the seeds of their own failure. Directing their critique 
towards the fact that programming options were limited by the network 
system, and calling for the creation of new options by means of the 
deregulation of new technologies, they reaffirmed their status as 
consumers and further facilitated the very concentration of media power 
that they had set out to challenge in the first place. 
Regardless of these failures, the broadcast reform movement did 
attempt to challenge powerful, well-capitalized interests on behalf of 
minority groups and individual members of local communities. The fact 
that the movement seized upon exceptionalist rhetoric to achieve those 
ends highlights what Tom Byers has called the conscience of 
exceptionalism, and contradicts Joyce Appleby's characterization of 
American exceptionalism as an exclusively hegemonic ideology. There 
have been different strains of exceptionalism in American history, and 
certain of these have had much to do with movements towards 
progressive reform. Holding the nation to a democratic and commu- 
nitarian ideal, exceptionalist rhetoric can produce salient critiques of 
American society in limited doses. In the case of the broadcast reform 
movement, however, it also ultimately served to accommodate the 
reformers themselves to the objects of their own criticism. 
Joyce Appleby succinctly isolates both the downfall of the broadcast 
reform movement and the motivating principle behind Newt Gingrich's 
exceptionalist rhetoric when she notes that "exceptionalism established a 
reciprocity between American abundance and high moral purposes."" In 
the early years of the Republic, this plank of exceptionalist ideology 
47 Rowland, 35. 
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undergirded the removal of the Native American population and the 
settling of the West, since as Appleby notes, "talting up land in the 
national domain could become a movement for spreading democratic 
institutions across the continent." In the context of communications 
deregulation, this has come to mean clearing bothersome regulations O L I ~  
of the way so that private corporations could develop (and profit from) 
what have become known as "technologies of abundance." Newt 
Gingrich carries this strain of thought to its logical conclusion, virtually 
conflating the virtues of participatory democracy with the luxuries of a 
consumer society and an open marketplace under the aegis of a 
technological revolution of world proportions. "The coming of the Third 
Wave Information Age brings potential for enormous improvement in the 
lifestyle choices of most Americans," he asserts. "There is every reason 
to believe that this new era will see a revolution in goods and services 
that will empower and enhance most people."" To achieve this goal, 
Gingrich advocates an even more thorough program of privatization and 
deregulation. "If we liberate entrepreneurs and make it relatively easy for 
them to discover and invent our new world," he says, "we will be rearing 
a generation that increases our wealth and improves our lives to a degree 
that we can now barely imagine."50 Far from a ranting f~~turist, Gingrich 
sounds like his arch-political rival Bill Clinton signing the Telecomm~m- 
ications Reform Act. If the results of the wave of deregulation that began 
during the broadcast reform movement are any indication, Gingrich and 
Clintion's deregulatory designs will only carry them further away from 
the exceptionalist democratic idyll towards which they profess to strive. 
49 Gingrich, 55. 
50 Gingrich, 61. 
